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SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2013-000639 11/06/2013

HONORABLE DOUGLAS GERLACH

CLERK OF THE COURT
R. Tomlinson
Deputy

CHRIS HENDERSON, et al. PATRICIA A PREMEAU

v.

ISAACMAN KAUFMAN & PAINTER P C COBER C PLUCKER

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiffs Chris Henderson and Peter Stevenson filed a complaint asserting that Defendant Isaacman, Kaufman, & Painter, P.C. ("IKP") committed legal malpractice when advising them about an investment in real property located in Arizona. IKP, which is a California law firm, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, maintaining that its contacts with Arizona are insufficient. Plaintiffs filed a response opposing the motion. The decision here is based on consideration of those submissions together with their accompanying exhibits, IKP's reply memorandum, and the arguments presented on Plaintiffs' behalf at a hearing held on October 24, 2013.[1]

[1] A former member of the IKP law firm, Brian Kaufman, is the lawyer whose alleged malpractice is the subject of the complaint. Mr. Kaufman died more than four years ago. His estate and his surviving spouse are named defendants in this matter, but they are not parties to the motion.

Relevant Facts.

The following facts are not disputed:

- Neither Henderson nor Stevenson is an Arizona resident. Moreover, at the times relevant to this case, Henderson was a California resident, and Stevenson was an Illinois resident.

- IKP has never been an Arizona resident, has no representatives or agents in Arizona, and has not transacted business in Arizona.

- The tort (legal malpractice) alleged in the complaint was not committed in Arizona.

- The only injury that Henderson and Stevenson allege is the diminution in value of an investment, and that injury did not occur in Arizona.[2]

Issue Presented.

When a California law firm gives advice to both California and Illinois clients concerning Arizona law as it relates to an investment the clients made in Arizona real estate, and there are no other contacts between Arizona and either of the clients, is that law firm subject to personal jurisdiction in Arizona?

Applicable Law.

A court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

[2] The alleged malpractice arises out of a failed real estate investment and the economic loss that it produced. No authority to which the Court has been directed (or that its independent research located) would allow one to conclude that a negative change in an out-of-state resident's investment portfolio occurs anywhere other than where that person resides, irrespective of the location of the physical investment. *Cf. Weil v. Am. Univ.*, 2008 WL 126604, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2008) (finding ownership of property in forum is analogous to an investment, which is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); *First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Brickellbush, Inc.*, 218 F. Supp. 2d 369, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ownership and sale of apartment, which is not alleged to have ever served as defendant's residence, insufficient to establish jurisdiction), *reconsidered on other grounds*, 219 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), *aff'd* 385 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2004). To conclude otherwise would mean, for example, that one who incurs a loss from investing in shares of IBM Corporation stock experiences the loss in Armonk, New York, which surely is a proposition that refutes itself. (Although *Weil* is an unreported decision, this Court is permitted to look to it for guidance. *E.g., Connick v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n*, 784 F.2d 1018, 1021 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & nn. 8-9 (1984).

A. General Jurisdiction.

General jurisdiction exists when a defendant's activities in the state are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic," even if the claim asserted against the defendant is unrelated to those activities. *Rollin v. William V. Frankel & Co.*, 196 Ariz. 350, 352-53, ¶9, 996 P.2d 1254, 1256-57 (App. 2000) (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). Plaintiffs do not contend that Arizona has general jurisdiction over IKP. Indeed, the record fails to suggest, much less demonstrate, that IKP has (or ever had) agents or offices in Arizona, owned Arizona property, transacted business in Arizona, or otherwise maintained anything approaching a substantial, systematic, or continuous presence in Arizona.

B. Specific Jurisdiction.

Even when general jurisdiction does not exist, a court may still exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant to the maximum extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. *Williams v. Lakeview Co.*, 199 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶5, 13 P.3d 280, 282 (2000) (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction: "The Due Process Clause limits state court jurisdiction over foreign defendants" (citing *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985)); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a).[3] Due process permits a court to assert such jurisdiction over a foreign defendant so long as that defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum state. *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). Thus, when a defendant's contacts with a state are insufficient to subject him or her to general jurisdiction, the following three-part test is applied to determine whether minimum contacts with the forum are sufficient to warrant specific jurisdiction:

> (i) "The nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws";
>
> (ii) "The claim must be one [that] arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities"; and

[3] Because specific jurisdiction is measured by what the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution permits, whether such jurisdiction exists "hinges on federal law" [*Williams*, 199 Ariz. at 3, ¶5, 13 P.3d at 282 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)], and thus, this ruling's substantial reliance on cases decided by federal courts.

> (iii) "The exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable."

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction); *Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB*, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); *Planning Group of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Mineral Props., Ltd.*, 226 Ariz. 262, 266, 270, ¶¶16, 25, 37, 246 P.3d 343, 347, 351 (2011).

Plaintiffs do not meet either of the first two tests. But even if they did, they must still demonstrate that jurisdiction in Arizona is reasonable, which they have not done.

1. Purposeful Direction or Availment and Forum-Related Activity.

The purposeful direction requirement is met only if it can be shown that IKP committed an intentional act that was expressly aimed at Arizona, and thereby caused harm that IKP knew would likely be suffered in Arizona. *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). Here, there is no showing, and for that matter, no reason to think that IKP knew that the economic loss stemming from any ill-conceived advice regarding an Arizona investment would be suffered in this state instead of in the clients' out-of-state pocketbooks, and, in fact, no injury was suffered in this state. [See note 2, above] Under *Calder*, that ends the inquiry.

Beyond that, Plaintiffs' argument seemingly ignores the compelling weight of authority, as reflected in decisions of federal appellate courts, which recognizes that, under *Calder*, a defendant must expressly aim the conduct forming the basis of the claim at the forum state, and not just at a known forum resident, before the courts of that forum may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. *E.g., Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 807 (finding lack of personal jurisdiction because Ohio defendant's "express aim was local" and not at California); *accord Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A.*, 623 F.3d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that *Calder* "made clear" that a defendant must "expressly aim[] its actions at the state with the knowledge that they would cause harm to the plaintiff there"); *IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG*, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (a defendant "must 'manifest behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on' the forum for *Calder* to be satisfied" (quoting *ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc.*, 126 F.3d 617, 625 (4th Cir. 1997)).[4] Here, even if IKP committed legal malpractice, its conduct was targeted at two clients who do not reside in Arizona and not at this state.

[4] *See also Johnson v. Arden*, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); *Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski*, 513 F.3d 476, 485-86 (5th Cir. 2008); *Noonan v. Winston Co.*, 135 F.3d 85, 90 (1st Cir. 1998); *United States v. Ferrara*, 54 F.3d 825, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne*, 46 F.3d 1071, 1080 (10th Cir. 1995).

Finally, the harm that has been alleged was the result of the non-resident Plaintiffs soliciting advice from IKP in California and was not the result of IKP soliciting their business in Arizona. Thus, in reasoning applicable here, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that "[o]ut-of-state legal representation does not establish purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, where the law firm is solicited in its home state and takes no affirmative action to promote business within the forum state." *Sher v. Johnson*, 911 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); *see also Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc*., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Purposeful availment analysis examines whether the defendant's contacts with the forum are attributable to his own actions or are solely the actions of the plaintiff" (citing *Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California*, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)); *Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds*, 823 F.2d 223, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction: where law firm's only substantial connection with the forum state was its work on a legal matter for a forum resident taking place outside the forum, law firm did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state).

For the same reasons, it cannot be said that the claim asserted against IKP arises out of its Arizona-related activities when the activity in which IKP purportedly engaged, i.e., giving erroneous legal advice (or failing to provide correct advice) that occurred out-of-state, was directed at out-of-state parties.

2. Reasonableness.

Even if it could be said that the legal services IKP provided to non-residents amounts to the purposeful availment of the privilege to conduct business in Arizona, and arises out of conduct directed at Arizona and not merely those non-residents, jurisdiction here may still be foreclosed if its exercise is not reasonable. *E.g., Asahi*, 480 U.S. at 114-15. The exercise of jurisdiction is considered reasonable only if it comports with "fair play and substantial justice." *Core–Vent*, 11 F.3d at 1482. The factors that a court considers when determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable include: (1) the extent of the defendant's "purposeful interjection" into the forum state's affairs, (2) the burden on the defendant, (3) the extent of any conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state, (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy, (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief, and (7) the existence of an alternate forum. *Id*. at 1488–89; *see also Ziegler v. Indian River County*, 64 F.3d 470, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1995). No single factor is dispositive. *Ziegler*, 64 F.3d at 475.

a. Purposeful Interjection.

Purposeful interjection and purposeful availment are not the same: a court may conclude that a defendant's conduct meets the purposeful availment standard but falls short of purposeful interjection. *Sher*, 911 F.2d at 1364. "The smaller the element of purposeful interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be anticipated and the less reasonable its exercise." *Core–Vent*, 11 F.3d at 1489 (quoting *Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz*, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.1981) (reversing trial court's decision to uphold jurisdiction)).

Here, a sufficient showing that IKP purposefully interjected itself into Arizona has not been made. It is beyond fair dispute that IKP never reached out to anyone in Arizona, none of its members or agents travelled to Arizona in connection with the investment, IKP did not solicit Plaintiffs' (or anyone else's) business in Arizona, it did not agree to represent an Arizona client, and it did not accept any form of payment for services from anyone in Arizona. The submitted evidence shows that IKP's only connection with Arizona was receipt of communications that were initiated by someone else and sent to IKP, frequently by or at the direction of one of the non-resident Plaintiffs.

Thus, given what little contact there was with Arizona, together with the complete lack of a targeted relationship with this state, IKP's level of purposeful interjection into Arizona was minimal, if even that. As such, this factor weighs in IKP's favor. *See Core–Vent*, 11 F.3d at 1488; *see also Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp.*, 90 F.3d 1523, 1534 (10th Cir.1996) (concluding that the drafting of an opinion letter by an out-of-state law firm for an in-state investor created a connection that was minimal).

b. Burden on Defendants.

The record does not establish the burden that IKP would experience if required to litigate in this forum beyond what can be inferred from the fact that IKP has no office or other presence in Arizona. In any event, the Ninth Circuit has noted that "[m]odern advances in communications and transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating" elsewhere, even "in another country." *Sinatra*, 854 F.2d at 1199. But here, where Plaintiffs, like IKP, are not Arizona residents, they should experience no increased burden of any significance if they were to pursue their claim in a California court. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of neither party. *See id.* at 1199 (stating that "[w]e examine the burden on the defendant in light of the corresponding burden on the plaintiff" (citation omitted)).

c. Conflict with Sovereignty of Defendant's State.

This factor becomes a choice of law question rather than a determination about whether exercising jurisdiction in Arizona would somehow compromise California state sovereignty. *See Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 477 & n.19, 483 & n.26. IKP's alleged negligence, having been committed in California, requires application of California law to Plaintiff's malpractice claim.[5]

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[5] Arizona's choice of law rules require application of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §145(2). *Bobbitt v. Milberg, LLP*, 285 F.R.D. 424, 428-29 (D. Ariz. 2012) (recognizing that section 145(2), which "deal[s] with choice of law issues relating to torts," "encompasses legal malpractice claims"). The contacts listed in that section are: (i) "the place where the injury occurred" (California for Henderson, who has since moved to Tennessee, and Illinois for Stevenson); (ii) "the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred" (California); (iii) "the domicile [and] residence . . . of the parties (at the time relevant here, California for Henderson and Illinois for Stevenson); and (iv) "the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered" (at the time relevant here, either California or both California and Illinois).

To get around the choice of law rules, Plaintiffs urge that out-of-state legal services provided to out-of-state residents regarding an Arizona investment amounts to the practice of law in Arizona, and that, alone, is sufficient to create jurisdiction in Arizona without regard for any other reasonableness factor. In support of their contention, Plaintiffs rely on three cases, a fair reading of which reveals that none are applicable in the circumstances here: *Beverage v. Pullman & Comley, LLC*, 232 Ariz. 414, 306 P.3d 71 (App. 2013); *Foley v. Schwartz*, 943 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. App. 2011); and *Liberatore v. Calvino*, 293 A.D.2d 217, 742 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2002).

- In *Beverage*, (i) an out-of-state law firm sent letters to an Arizona resident in an effort to secure that resident as a client; (ii) accepted payment from the Arizona resident; (iii) provided legal services (i.e., advice) to the Arizona resident; and (iv) knew that the Arizona resident would rely on those services, with the result being that (v) the Arizona resident experienced a financial injury in Arizona.

- In *Foley*, the court concluded that a series of letters sent by an Ohio attorney to Indiana residents, together with the act of malpractice occurring in Indiana, was sufficient to establish minimum contacts with Indiana. See 943 N.E.2d at 382 (referring to "these contacts," meaning the letters), 384.

- In *Liberatore*, a lawyer admitted to practice in both Rhode Island and Massachusetts provided legal services in New York, which the court concluded was sufficient to establish jurisdiction in that state.

If one were to assume that Plaintiffs' contention is correct, then when an Arizona lawyer, who is admitted to practice only in this state, represents an Arizona client in litigation in this state that is, under choice of law rules, governed by California law, that lawyer engages in the practice of law in California and, by that act alone, submits to personal jurisdiction in California should his client later choose to pursue a malpractice claim there. By the same reasoning, when a California lawyer gives a California client wrong advice about the New York state tax consequences accompanying a sale of stock effected on the New York Stock exchange, that lawyer practices law and subjects himself to personal jurisdiction in New York, even when he has never travelled to or in any way conducted business in New York. The fact is that in cases involving choice-of-law issues, lawyers necessarily must research, evaluate, make decisions about, assert positions to the courts concerning, and otherwise give advice to their clients based on their reading of another state's law. Plaintiffs' stated view that giving an in-state client advice about another state's law amounts to the unauthorized practice of law in that other state seemingly overlooks that courts throughout the country have been approving of such conduct for well over a century. But, in any event, the issue here is jurisdiction, and no authority to which Plaintiffs have directed the Court recognizes that legal representation in such circumstances creates jurisdiction in that other state; indeed, relevant authority is to the contrary. *See e.g., Sher*, 911

Although Plaintiffs dispute that conclusion, resolution of the issue does not affect the outcome here. Even if Arizona law were to apply, no sound reason warrants so much as slight concern that California courts are ill-equipped to apply that law there. Thus, this factor weighs in IKP's favor.[6]

d. Arizona's Interest in Adjudicating the Dispute.

A forum state has an interest in providing relief for its citizens and especially those who have been tortiously injured. *See Core–Vent*, 11 F.3d at 1488. That interest diminishes, however, as a forum state's citizens engage in matters outside the forum. *Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd.*, 995 F.2d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction). Here, Arizona's interest in protecting its citizens does not merely diminish, it does not exist because no Arizona resident was the target of or was otherwise affected by IKP's alleged conduct. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of IKP.

e. Efficiency.

Courts evaluate this factor primarily on the basis of the location of relevant witnesses and documents. *Core–Vent*, 11 F.3d 1489. Generally, the most efficient forum is the location where the operative conduct occurred, especially when most of the relevant evidence is located there. *Fields v. Sedgwick Assoc. Risks, Ltd.*, 796 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir. 1986). With the operative conduct in this case having occurred in California, and the relevant evidence either located there or otherwise capable of easily being made available there, this factor weighs in favor of IKP.[7]

F.2d at 1363; *see also e.g.*, *Trierweiler*, 90 F.3d at 1534; *Austad*, 823 F.2d at 226-27; *Nash Finch Co. v. Preston*, 867 F. Supp. 866, 868-69 (D. Minn. 1994) (granting motion to dismiss legal malpractice action against out-of-state law firm for lack of personal jurisdiction).

[6] Plaintiffs also have made no showing that Arizona's standard of care in legal malpractice cases is in any meaningful way different from California's standard of care.

[7] The parties all reside out of state, and it is reasonable to assume that the relevant documentary evidence is, at least to a substantial extent, in their possession (Plaintiff's response does not demonstrate otherwise). In any event, the location of any documentary evidence is not a significant factor to be considered. *See e.g.*, *ADE Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp.*, 138 F. Supp. 2d 565, 571 (D. Del. 2001) ("With new technologies for storing and transmitting information, the burden of gathering and transmitting documents 3,000 miles is probably not significantly more than it is to transport them 30 miles"); *see also Sinatra*, 854 F.2d at 1199 (similar). At the hearing, Plaintiffs attempted to urge that, in effect, an Arizona standard-of-care expert made Arizona the most efficient forum. Leaving aside whether such an expert is necessary [see note 5, above], the ease with which a paid expert witness can travel from Arizona to Southern California is self-evident. In any event, the location and convenience of expert witnesses warrants little

f. Plaintiff's Interest in Convenient and Effective Relief and the Existence of an Alternate Forum.

The sixth and seventh factors, existence of an alternate forum and convenience and effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff, are closely related. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that an alternate forum is unavailable, either because there is no court in any other state that will hear the case, or, even if there is, because Plaintiffs cannot obtain satisfactory relief anywhere other than Arizona. *Core–Vent*, 11 F.3d at 1490. No showing has been made, however, and nothing in the record suggests, that litigating in California will prevent or even diminish Plaintiffs' ability to obtain effective relief.

In that regard, moreover, Plaintiffs' desire to pursue their claim in Arizona warrants little consideration. Indeed, as a general matter, a plaintiff's preference for litigating in his home forum "does not affect the balancing." *Id*. at 1490; *see also Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K.*, 757 F.2d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 1985) (remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); *see generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (for purposes of forum non conveniens inquiry, a resident-plaintiff's choice of forum "should not be given dispositive weight"). Here, however, we are dealing with Plaintiffs who, in effect, have expressed a desire for not litigating in their home forums, making their preference for Arizona inconsequential. *Cf. Coonley & Coonley v. Turck*, 173 Ariz. 527, 533, 844 P.2d 1177, 1183 (App. 1993) (affirming dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds: "[P]laintiff's choice of forum may be given less deference when he is not a resident of the forum, and he cannot offer specific reasons of convenience to support his choice"); *Piper Aircraft*, 454 U.S. at 255-56 (same).[8]

These two factors, therefore, weigh in favor of IKP.

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consideration. *Cf., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Checkpoint Software Technologies Ltd.*, 797 F. Supp. 2d 472, 483 (D. Del. 2011) (forum non conveniens motion: "[E]xperts are compensated for their time and expenses, including expenses for travel, and have made an affirmative decision to participate in this litigation; experts are retained without regard for their residence. Accordingly, the location of experts carries very little weight"); *Cerussi v. Union College*, 144 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[I]t is well settled that the location of expert witnesses is irrelevant to a transfer decision" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Jordan v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co.*, 590 F. Supp. 997, 998 (D.C. Pa. 1984) (granting motion to transfer to New York: that plaintiffs' "three expert witnesses have offices in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is inconsequential" – "If need be, counsel could easily videotape this testimony for purposes of trial").

[8] "The policy behind not deferring to a nonresident plaintiff's choice of venue appears tied into the notion that plaintiffs should be discouraged from forum shopping." *Williams v. Bowman*, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

In short, an analysis of the seven reasonableness factors establishes that six weigh in IKP's favor and one is a tie. By that standard, the most reasonable forum for this lawsuit is not Arizona, but California.

Additional Matters.

Plaintiffs' response requests the opportunity to undertake discovery and the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing in the event that the Court is not persuaded to deny the motion. But no amount of discovery or testifying witnesses will change the undisputed facts identified above. And, those undisputed facts establish that allowing this matter to go forward in an Arizona court would offend "traditional conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice." *International Shoe Co.*, 326 U.S. at 320. Therefore, there is no warrant for granting Plaintiffs' request.

Finally, according to the Court's records, no other defendant in this matter [see note 1, above] has been served. By Court order and by Rule, the deadline to effect service (May 17, 2013) has passed. [See Notice of Intent to Dismiss for Lack of Service (4/24/13); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(i)] No request to extend that deadline was filed.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. IKP's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is granted.

2. The Estate of Brian Kaufman and its personal representative, and Mr. Kaufman's surviving spouse, if any, are dismissed from this matter for lack of prosecution.

3. By the Court's signature below, this becomes a final, formal, and appealable order from the date of entry by the Office of the Clerk that appears on page 1 above.

Date: _____

/ s / HONORABLE DOUGLAS GERLACH

JUDICIAL OFFICER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2013-000639 11/06/2013

ALERT: The Arizona Supreme Court Administrative Order 2011-140 directs the Clerk's Office not to accept paper filings from attorneys in civil cases. Civil cases must still be initiated on paper; however, subsequent documents must be eFiled through AZTurboCourt unless an exception defined in the Administrative Order applies.